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OF BANKING: A THEORY AND TEST 
I. Introduction 
One of the important features of banking in LDCs is the heavy 
-dependence on sources of funds other than private deposits such as 
government credits, foreign borrowings, and bank equity. In other 
words, deposit banking is still underdeveloped in many LDCs. Govern-
ment credits to banking (hereafter called G) consist of government deposits, 
government and central bank loans to commercial banks and bank notes issued 
by commercial banks; bank note issue was particularly important for banking 
in early modern Japan. While an initial supply of sizable amount of G 
is undoubtedly effective in promoting the initiation of banking business 
through providing initial loanable funds, making the new business of 
banking profitable and, possibly, enhancing the reliability of banks, 
the continuing supply of G after the establishment of banks is detri­
mental to the development of banking since G retards the effort of 
banks to extend private deposits. The purpose of this paper is to 
show that an effective way of bringing about deposit banking is to 
decrease the government credits to the banking sector under the condi­
tion of free interest rates on deposits. 
The average share of private deposits in total bank liabilities 
;1: This paper is part of a joint study with Hugh Patrick on finance and
economic development. The author is grateful for corranents from William
Brainard, William Keeton, Hugh Patrick and Kazuo Sato. The research
assistance by Kazumi Asako is also gratefully acknowledged. Of course,
the remaining shortcomings are solely his responsibility. 
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1of 42 LDCs is 67.4%, and 
the shares of government credits, foreign liabilities and bank equity 
are 14.1%, 8.3% and 9.9% respectively. While the distribution of 
shares of bank equity is concentrated around the 10% level (ranging 
from 4.3% to 17.6%), that of government credit is widely dispersed 
from zero to 50.7%, with banking systems in 12 countries having ratios 
greater than 20% and 20 countries less than 10%. A similar wide dis­
persion exists for the shares of foreign liabilities. Consequently, 
the shares of private deposits in total bank liabilities are also 
widely dispersed, from 31.7% to 95.2%. It is interesting to note that 
a similar low dependence on private deposits characterized early bank-
ing in Japan. 2 The shares of private deposits, government credits 
and bank equity were respectively 12.1%, 41.4% and 46.5% in 1878-82, 
27.2%, 28.5% and 44.3% in 1888-92 and 67.9%, 5.6%, 26.5% in 1908-12. 
The importance of deposit banking is well-known. There are good 
reasons why an expansion of banking operations with low dependence on 
private deposits does not necessarily have very favorable effects on 
economic development. One possible reasoning is as follows. 
Assume a simple world of currency, deposits, bank equity, govern­
ment credit to.banking, and industrial capital equity. With a constant 
currency supply, an expansion of banking operations lowers the required 
1In IMF International Financial Statistics, data on capital 
accounts of the commercial banking systems are available for 55 develop-
ing countries, among which 42 countries are selected which have such 
data as GNP and GDCF for the sake of convenience of future study. nata 
are for 1971. Extended data coverin2 a wider range of years are under preparation. 
2 see Teranishi and Patrick [1978]. 
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rate of return on investment activity, and thereby encourages economic 
development, whenever it causes a shift of the aggregate demand func-
1tion of capital equity against currency. The shift depends both on 
the allocation of borrowed funds by the debtors of banks and on the 
method of financing by the creditors of banks. 2 For the sake of 
simplicity, let us assume that the debtors do not bold currency and 
allocate all their bank borrowings into real investment. Then, the 
shift of the aggregate capital demand function depends solely on the 
method of financing bank liabilities. If bank expansion is financed 
by an increase in bank equity, it is more likely that bank equity 
holders have bought bank equity by selling their holdings of equity 
capital of other industries rather than by reducing currency holdings 
because bank equity is a closer substitute to industrial equities 
than to currency. In this case, there would be no shift of the 
aggreg~te capital demand function, and bank expansion would not have 
any (favorable) effects on economic activity. 
When bank expansion is financed by government credits, the situa-
tion would be more or lees the same because government would be holding 
the least amount of idle balances, and would finance its credit to 
banking by reducing investment in other areas unless it creates additional 
1For this type of theorizing, see Tobin and Brainard [1963]. In 
this paragraph, all capital equities other than bank equity are assumed 
- to be homogeneous, and the possibility of higher efficiency in fund 
allocation by banks relative to individual asset holders (such as scale 
economy in management etc.) is neglected. 
2
fhis ignores reserve currency at banks. 
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currency.1 If, however, the expansion of banking is financed by an 
increase in private deposits, the deposit increase would most likely 
be financed by a decrease in currency holding; i.e. from the closest 
substitute to deposits. In this case, bank expansion would cause a 
definite increase in the aggregate demand for capital and encourage 
economic development. 
Thus, an expansion of banking has a net favorite effect on capital 
accumulation only when it is financed through an in.crease in the share 
of private deposits. In other words, only through deposit growth can 
banks play an expansionary role in financial intermediation. How, 
then, can the share of deposits in bank liabilities be increased? 
Since this question is related to broad questions 6f the modernization 
of economy as well as various banking and monetary policies, one can 
conceive of a wide range of interrelated policy measures. Indeed, it 
is quite true that a monetary reform as a banking policy should be 
specified for each specific phase of development (Ranis [1977])and for 
each specific country (Cameron (1967]). 
In this paper, however~ we confi~e ourselves to the more basic 
questions concerning the equilibrium of the deposit market. Concretely, 
· two formal questions are investigated: (1) the effect of an autonomous 
shift of the demand function or supply function for deposits and (2) the 
effect of a policy-induced shift of the supply function for deposits. 
½he currency supply has been assumed to be fixed, however. And 
any expansion of currency could alternatively be used to finance direct 
government investment. The monetary policy effect of government credits 
is analyzed in the next section. 
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The autonomous shift of the demand or supply functions of de­
posits cerresponds to the so-called promotion of the banking habit and 
the increase in the efficiency of banking operations. While these 
shifts can be brought about by a number of measures such as education, 
advertising, changes in availability of banks and branch offices, 
inspection and guidance of banking operations, and improvement in the 
communications and transportation systems, we will not consider these 
in detail, and shall take the shifts as exogenously given, focussing 
our analysis on the effects of these shifts. 
On the other hand, some government policies such as taxes and 
subsidies, regulation of bank equity, and manipulation of government 
credits to banks have more direct and definite effects. In view of 
the high reliance on government credits by banks in many LDCs, the 
control of G is very important and, as will be shown below, has 
definite effects on deposit market equilibrium. 
In the next section, we present a simple static theoretical 
analysis of these two questions. Results of comparative statics are 
evaluated by t-wo criteria; effects on the private deposits-net worth 
ratio and on the required rate of return on investment. The first criterion 
is adopted on the premise that deposit banking per se is desirable in providing 
an efficient payment system as well as in enabling a more ample supply of 
short-term credit. The second criterion is necessary because even if some policy 
1s effective in encouraging deposit banking, its desirability should be discounted 
if it is incompatible with real development. The main conclusions 
reached are as follows. (1) An autonomous increase in the efficiency 
of bank operations as represented by a reduction in the cost of banking 
is effective in bringing about deposit banking and also lowers the 
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required rate of return on investment, encouraging capital accumula­
tion. (2) An autonomous development of the banking habit as repre­
sented by a shift from currency to deposits in assets holders port­
folio lowers the required rate of return on investment, but the effect 
on deposit banking is indefinite, and it ia theoretically possible 
that the equilibrium deposit is reduced as a result of an increase in 
the banking habit. (3) The policy of reducing G supply accompanied 
by government open-market purchase of securities is effective both 
in promoting deposit banking and in lowering the required rate of 
return on investment. (4) The policy of reducing G supply accompanied 
by a decrease in currency supply raises the required rate of return on 
investment, but promote deposit banking insofar as the substitution 
effect of deposit and Gin the subjective equilibrium of banks is 
sufficiently large. 
Section III presents an empirical analysis of G policy with respect 
to the assets market in early modern Japan. Demand and supply functions 
of deposits as well as the demand function for currency are success-
fn11y eArim~r~n; and the coefficient of G is show-n to be significant 
with the correct sign. This is strong support for our recommendation 
of G reduction policy. Finally, section IV provides some discussion 
of the policy issues regarding deposit banking in LDCs with particular 




Our model is in the DlOde of the general equilibrium model of assets 
markets developed in Tobin and Brainard [1963] and Tobin [1969]. It 
consists of four sectors-government (including the central bank), 
(coJIDDercial) banks, individual asset holders and corporate (non-bank) 
firms--and the following four financial instruments. 
(i) Currency, comprised of government currency C 
and bank notes issued by commercial banks G1 • 
(ii) Securities issued by firms, banks and the govern­
ment and held by asset holders, banks and the 
government. The amounts of securities issued 
by firms, banks and the government are E, 8E 
and aE respectively. E, a and 6 are positive 
constants and aE represents the net issue of 
securities. All the securities are assumed to 
be perfect substituteg with ~ach other. 
(iii) Deposits sueplied by banks and held by asset holders. Supply is 
denoted by DS and demand by fid. 
(iv) G, consisting of G1 and G2 • G1 , as defined 
above, comprises one part of currency; its share 
in total G was important in banking in early 
Meiji Japan. G2 represents central bank credits 
to banks plus eovernment deposits in banks. 
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1Rates of interest on Gare assumed to be zero. 
The balance sheet of each sector is shown in Table 1. K is the 
capital stock, and p and pq represent the commodity price and the 
mark.et price of existing capital goods respectively. Both Kand pare 
constant. The rate of interest on securities is defined by the 
following formula: 
r • .E.e! (1)QE 
where Q denotes the price of securities and p represents the physical 
marginal product of capital, so that r is equal to the marginal value 
product divided by the market value of securities issued by firms. This 
interest rate is the required rate of return of investment in our model. 
A fall (rise) in r encourages (discourages) capital accumulation. 
Demand functions for assets of asset holders are assumed to be 
linear homogeneous in net worth, and also the gross substitutability 
among assets is assumed. 
QEh -H(r, i, >.) W; H > O, Hi< o, ~ ~ 0 (2)r I\ 
-d DdD • (r, i, ).) W; Dd < 0, Dd > 0, Dd 
). 
> 0 (3)r i 
=<i dC • C (r, i, >.) W; Cd < o, Cd < 0, Cd >< 0 (4)r i ). 
1Analytically, coIIIIlercial bank note issue is nothing more than 
government credit with a zero interest rate. Typically, interest is 
not paid on government deposits. Central bank credits are usually 
supplied at a relatively low rate which can be regarded as zero for 





Net deficit C(government currency) 
(government de­G2posits and central aQE (net outstanding 
bank credits) securities) 
Commercial Banks 
QEb (demand for 
securities) 
G1 (bank note issue) 
G2 (government deposits and central bank credits) 
Ds (supply of deposits) 
BQE (bank equity) 
Asset Holders. 
QEh (demand for securities) W (net worth) 
nu.l (demand for deposits) 
-d
C (demand for currency) 
Firms 




i is the rate of interest on deposits. An increase in shift parameter 
1A means the autonomous development of the banking habit. Since the 
concept of the banking habit is usually concerned with the substitution 
between currency and deposits, a more specific assumption about the sign 
of partial derivatives can be used where necessary. 
(6) 
It is assumed that the deposit market and assets investments 
market faced by banks are imperfect, so that marginal costs of de­
posits rises as the amount of deposits increases for a given size of 
the economy increases and likewise for the marginal return on assets 
investments. Thus the maximization problem for banks can be written as 
_ iDS _ -cl b -2 (-s )maximize n • rQEb (QE, pK, e) - C D, pK, e 
subject to QEb • G + G + Ds + SQE
1 2 
where Il is profit, and c1 and c2 denote the administrative costs of 
assets investments and the deposits respectively. 9 is a shift para-
1 rn his careful and extensive discussion, Porter [1966] uses a 
broader definition of the banking habit which is close to the concept 
of deposit banking in our terminology. 
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meter of the cost functions which represents the efficiency of banking 
operations. Dividing by pK, the problem is. rewritten as 
2maximize Il/pK • rm - id - c1 (1, 0) - c (d, 0) 
subject to m • g1 + g2 + d + %B 
where 
and c1 and c2 are assumed to be linear homogeneous in QEb and pK, and 
Ds and pK respectively. It is also assumed that 
and that g and g2 are constant.1 
Two comments should be added on the role of pK (the current value 
of capital stock) in this formulation. In the first place, pK works 
as a scale While it is 
undeniable that costs should be dependent on some scale index, the 
choice of the index is an empirical question and there is not particu­
larly firm ground for using pK as the index. Net worth is another 
possible choice, and the empirical analysis in Section 3 yields good 
results by using net worth instead of pK. In the second place, the 
policy variables G and G
2 
are assumed to be proportional to pK. This
1 
is also a question to be examined empirically. Total bank assets QEb 
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. 1 
or bank equity QE are other candidates. 
The first order condition for the maximization is given as 
1 2 
r - i - c - c • o m d 
Differentiating this and the balance sheet constraint, we have 
od am- (1 + Cl !_) I J > oar - ar - mm 2 
r 
od am -1/J < 0fi - H -
1 2-l < od 1> ell- •C I J ~ 0, • Cd/J ~ 0 - o(gl + g2) mm - 0 (gl+g2) 
1 od 1 2 - - < - -cl l / J t:: 0, > !!. - !. I J > or - as - mm r r - as r Cdd 
od am 1 2 -ae - ae • < -cme - cd0) 1 J > 0 
Therefore, we can write the deposit supply function 2 as 
-.D
d = - (7)
pK 
1while such a G variable as government deposits is sometimes sup­
plied preferentially to large banks, this does not necessarily mean that 
QEb or 8QE is used as the policy index for the aggregate supply of govern­
ment deposits. 
2In most modern economies, the deposit rate is set by regulation 
at a lower rate than the competitive equilibrium level, so that the 
equilibrium amount of deposits is simply equal to the demand for deposits 
at the regulated rate. In such a situation, there is no use for the 
notion of the deposit supply function. However, when private banks 
can set the deposit rate, the concept of the deposit supply function 
is very important. A few examples which explicitly introduce the 
deposit supply function are J. Tobin [1969], D. H. Pyle [1971] and M.A. 
Klein [1971]. Incidentally, in Tobin's model there is no scale factor 
for the deposit supply function (the total deposit supply is simply a 
function of. interest rates), which means any two economies with the 
same interest rates have the same deposit supplies irrespective of the 
size of the economies. 
-13-
• s s ans 2D > 0 D < O, -1 < D • ----_< 0, D > 0 r ' i - g a(g +g ) e1 2 
- _! < D8 _< 0 
r - e 
and the bank demand function for securities as 
m (8) 
One important feature of these derived functions is the substitution 
of g and g2 with deposit supply.
1 When g or g is increased it is1 1 2 
partly offset by a decrease in deposit supply; consequently the demand 
for security investments increases less than proportionately. It is 
also important to note that this substitution effect depends on the 
relative degree of imperfection of the deposit and asset investments 
market. If c!d • 0, that is if the deposit market is perfect,2 then 
in the absolute value. If, on the other hand, the assets investments 
1market is perfect (Cmm• O), then the entire adjustment to a change in 
G occurs in bank securities holdings, since 
1There is also substitutability between deposit supply and bank 
· equity, for l!hich the analysis is similar. 
2The intuitive meaning of this is simple. Because banks can ob-
tain as much funds as they want at constant marginal cost if the de­
posit market is perfect, a decrease in G is simply substituted for 
an increase in deposit supply. 
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In other words, the substitution effect is larger the more perfect the 
deposit market (holding the degree of imperfection in the asset invest­
ment market constant). 
Let us describe the market equilibrium. The equilibrium condition 
for the currency market is given by 
C+ G
1 
• Cd (r, 1, A) W (9) 
That for the deposit market is 
s dD (r, 1, g + g
2 , 0, 8) pK • D (r, 1, A) W (10)1 
and for the security market 
(1 +a+ 8) QE = H (r, i, A) W (11) 
+ Ds (r, i, g + g
2
, e, 8) pK1 
+ Gl + G2 + 8 QE 
By using (9) ,....__ (11) and the balance sheet constraint of the banking 
sector, net worth is written as 
w ii a) QE + C - G (12)
2 




d (r, i, A) { (1 + 
Cwhere c • The equation for the security market is excluded bypK 
--- -
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Walras' Law, and the commodity market is neglected following the con­
vention of Tobin-type assets market analysis. 
2. Effects of Autonomous Changes in Banking Efficiency and 
the Banking Habit 
Let us examine the effects of an increase in e. This can be re­
garded as a formal representation of the autonomous improvement in the 
efficiency of banking operations. We have 
* 1 0 Al2ar < 0
30 A Ds 
e A22 
3i 1 All---* - 0 > 0 ae A Ds
A21 e 
and, with respect to the ratio of private deposits to net worth, 
*dD*d *d ar lL * >-- • D + n*d o 
d0 r ae i ae 
where 
All• c! {(l + ~) f + c - g2 .} - Cd (1 + ~) ~ < 0 r 
A = Cd {(l +a)£+ c - g } < 0
12 i r 2 
D8A • Dd {(1 +a).£.+ c - g2} - Dd(l + a) .e.2 - < 021 r r r r 
and 
A • < 0 
---
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The implications of these results are obvious. An increase in 0 causes 
a rightward shift of the deposit supply function, yielding a higher 
interest rate on deposits. Demand for securities by banks is also 
increased. Although demand for securities by asset holders is decreased 
by the higher deposit interest rate,.this decrease is numerically 
smaller than the increase in the demand by banks. Thus, the required 
rate of return on investment r is lowered. A rise in i and a fall in 
r causes the equilibrium deposits to increase. 
An improvement of the banking habit is formally represented by 
an increase in ). . The results are 
ar* 1 I)---- +Cdn ). { (1 + a) - + C - g2}A r ~2 
-Dd {(1 + a) -
p 
+ C -). r g2} A22 
a* -Cd {----1 All ). (1 + a) £.r + C - g2 }a>. A 
p-Dd {A21 ). (1 + a) -r + C - &2 
} 
1By applying assumption (6), these become 
-c~"-or* A t ,, • __ '\ p
"" \ \.I. T r:J.) -+ C - &2 'J ('½_2 + A22) < 0a>. A r 
ai* -Cd). p






The second term on the right hand side of this equation is negative. 
Thus, in this case, an increase in the banking habit does not neces­
sarily assure an increase in the equilibrium share of deposits. In 
terms of Figure 1, both the CC curve representing currency market 
equilibrium and the DD curve representing deposit market equilibrium 
shift leftward. By the property given in footnote 7 and assumption 
6, the shift of the CC curve is greater than that of the DD curve, so 
that both rand i decrease. In the deposit market equilibrium de­
picted in Figure 2, the deposit demand function shifts rightward 
directly due to an increase in A and indirectly due to a fall in r, 
while the deposit supply curve shifts leftward due to a fall in r. 
Therefore, when the interest elasticity of the deposit function is 
large or deposit supply is highly elastic to a change in r, it is 
possible that the equilibrium amount of deposits is decreased as a 
result of an increase in the deposit habit as stipulated in (6). 
However, it must be noted that the reality of this paradoxical 
result is somewhat questionable. In a financially underdeveloped 
economy where a mere increase in knowledge of the availability of 
deposits induces a shift from currency to deposits in people's port­
folio, the interest elasticity of holding deposits is considered to 
be small. In other words, the degree of portfolio shift of this kind 
does not change with the level of deposit interest rates. It can be 
said that in an economy where A can be significantly changed, the 
interest elasticity of deposit demand is usually small, so that a pol­










i ~ demand for deposits 
;.upply of deposits 
deposit 
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3. Effects of G Policy 
In our model, there are two kinds of G, of which G1 is itself a 
part of currency and the value of G is constrained by the balance
2 
sheet of the government. Therefore, in the analysis of G policy, 
it is necessary to stipulate the way by which G is changed. We will 
examine the following two cases: (1) G policy with variable currency 
1
supply and (2) G policy with variable security supply. Although 
there are two components of G, the policy of changing G and, at the2 
2 
same time, changing C in the same amount and direction. Therefore, 
it is sufficient to analyse only the effect of G manipulation.1 
(1) dG1 (or equivalently dG2 • dC) 
This policy assumes a change in currency supply accompanied by G policy. 
By setting dg in equations (13) and (14), we obtain1 
1- - a)£.+ c - g) - Ds} < 0 3A r 2 i 
<.O 
1Changing G with variable government expenditure is another possibility. 
To deal with this case, we must reformulate the model into that of period 
analysis, a task left to the future. 
2In equations (9)- (11), all the changes in net worth, currency 
supply, and central bank and government credits to banking are the 
same under these two configurations. 
3 d s d sThe sign of Di - DgCi follows from -1 ~ Dg ~ 0 and the gross substitution 
assumption; i.e. Dd - DsOd > Dd +Cd• -Hd > 0 




A decrease in G causes a rightward shift of the deposit supply function, 
causing a rise in the deposit rate. However, since the currency supply 
is decreased in this case, the security interest rate (required rate 
of return on investment is increased, 1 and the final effect on capital 
accumulation is unfavorable. Although the sign of the equilibrium 
amount of deposits is ambiguous in general, it is definitely increased 
by the G reduction policy if the substitution effect is numerically 
large enough; that is 
if and only if 
> Ds 
g 
A1~h~1gh r is raised by a reduction of Gin case, 
because of the decreased currency supply in this policy configuration. 
It is important to note that the deposit substitution effect of G itself 
has a favorable effect on capital accumulation, although its numerical 
value is smaller than the effect of the currency reduction (see footnote 3, 
page 19). 
l A rise in i causes a decrease in the demand for currency. However, 
this decrease is not as large as the decrease in the currency supply. This 
is because the gross substitution assumption requires a decrease in security
demand as irises. 
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(2) dGl •-de• d(aQE) (or equivalently, dG2 • dC and d(aQE) • -dC) 
In this policy, the supply of securities by the government is changed by 
the G policy. The currency supply is kept constant. By setting 
1 r a 
de• -dg1 and 
- dg + - dr in equations (13) and (14), we obtain 
P 1 r 
~2 Ds > 0 
A' g 





All+ t r 2 Al2 
A,., < 0 
+ 0d paA21 2 A22 r 
A decrease in G raises i by shifting the deposit supply function 
(with the demand function constant), and in the currency market, the 
higher i causes a fall in r since the currency supply is constant. In 
this case, the G reduction policy not only decreases the required rate 
l dg • d(a ~) • d(a £.) • - £. adr + £. da 
1 pK r 2 r r 
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of return on investment, but also increases the equilibrium deposit 
level. It is also interesting to note that all the effects are strictly 
proportional to the value of Ds (substitution effect). Therefore, ifg 
D
8 
g - e 
0 
This is because the decrease in the security supply is exactly equal to 
the decrease in the security demand by banks in the absence of any sub­
stitution effect. 
III. Empirical Analysis of G Policy 
The policy of reducing G is shown to be quite effective in bringing 
about deposit banking by inducing a substitution for G of private de­
posits. It is important to note that the condition of a market-determined 
deposit interest rate is crucial to this analysis. If the deposit rate 
paid is regulated so as to be below its competitive equilibrium level, 
the equilibrium amount of deposits would be determined irrespective 
of the deposit supply condition. In other words, banks would simply 
supply deposits up to the amount demanded at the ceiling interest rates 
on deposits. In that situation there would be no substitutability 
between deposit supply and G, and G could not be manipulated to affect 
bank deposit supply; all G would simply be reflected in changes in 
bank loans {and other invested assets). 
The experience of banking in early Japan presents a typical example 
of this kind of G policy. In Japan, the modern banking system was 
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established by supplying a huge amount of G initially, thereby making 
it more profitable to enter the banking business. After most of the 
private banks were set up, however, the government deliberately tried 
to reduce the supply of G with the more or less explicit purpose of 
·promoting deposit banking. Moreover, this G policy was done under 
almost completely free market conditions; in particular, there was 
1virtually no regulation of interest rates. 
Therefore, by estimating the asset demand and supply functions 
for this period of Japan, we can obtain empirical counterparts of 
equations (13) and (14). Estimation is done for the period2 1888-1913, 
and the method of estimation of two-stage least squares developed by 
Fair (1970] is utilized because of the strong possibility of serial 
correlation in disturbance terms on account of the lagged endogenous 
variables. 
Our model is summarized in Table 2. The results are generally 
in line with our expectations. In the demand for currency equation, the 
signs of the coefficients for interest rates are correct and that for 
deposit rate significant;3 the wealth effect as measured is not significant, 
• while the explanatory power of the income term is strong. In almost all 
forms of estimation experimented with, we obtained better results by using 
the square root of income rather than income itself •. This suggests the 
1These points are explained in detail in Teranishi and Patrick (1978]. 
2nata are not adequate prior to 1888, and after 1913 or so the value 
of G became insignificantly small. 
3The deposit rate used here is for six-month time deposits; it should 
be noted that interest was paid on most forms of demand deposits as well, 






(1) Supply of Currency 
c c 
w w 
(2) Demand for currency 
i • -0.0823 - 0.0113i - 0.000lr· + 12.6689 ~ + 0.0137 ~ 
(2.93) (-2.86) (-0.35) (4.38) (0.33) 
+ 0.1316 ~)-1 - 0.0092 <8>-1 
(0.65) (-0.16) 
2
R • 0.990, p • - -0.326 
(3) Demand for Deposits 
~ • 0.0867 + 0.0188i + 0.0014 r. - 4~5972 y~ - 0.2096 ~ 
(0.76) (1.19) (1.39) (-0.52) (-1.74) 
+ 0.6649 ~)~l -0.0041 ~-)_1 
(2.82) (-0.76) 
2R • 0.903, p -= 0.210 
(4) Suoolv of Deoosits 
D' G 
- • 0.1947 - 0.0407i + 0.0026 r - 0.8819 L 
w 
(1.02) (-1.47) (3.02) (-1.68) 
PK D'+ 0.0209 w + o.1965 <w>_1 
(1.72) . (3. 71) 
2
R • 0.658, p. o.~59 
(5) Equiiibrium Condition of Deposit Market 
D' D' D 
w D W 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Notations: 
Endogenous 
C/W currency (outside banks) - wealth ratio 
D/W private deposits plus postal savings - wealth ratio 
D' /w: private deposits - wealth ratio 
i : rate of interest on deposits 
r rate of yield on securities (including capital gains 
and losses) 
Exogenous 
. .C/w : currency (outside bank.$) .- wealth ratio 
Y½/w: (square root of) gross national expenditure (at 
current prices) - wealth ratio 
G/L: government credit to banking - total bank funds ratio 
D'/D: private deposits - privat~ deposits plus postal 
savings ratio 
Bil/W: rate of change of wealth 
PK/W: gross capital stock (at current prices) - wealth ratio 
Note: Figures in parenthesis are t values. R
2 is adjusted for degree5 
of freedom. P denotes the coefficient of serial correlation of disturbance 
terms.
Sources: The numbers of parentheses indicate the· corresponding columns 
in Statistical Table II of Teranishi ~nd Patrick [1978]. 
C(~) • (19) - (20), ~ • (2) + (3) + (19) - (7), D • (6), D! • (5) + (18), 
L • (6) + (7) + (8), Y • (16), PK• (1), G • (7), 
i • (11), re• {(2) x (13) + (3) x (15) } 
~ 
¾ ((2) + (3) ). 
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existence of scale economy in currency use during this period, reflecting 
probably the fact the monetization of the economy had already been 
virtually completed by 1888 or so. In the demand for 
deposits equation, the deposit interest rate coefficient is of correct 
aign and significant but for the yield on securities is not correct, while 
the income effect is not significant. The negative sign for the wealth 
effect, together with its insignificance in the currency equation, 
suggests a positive wealth effect on security holding. The speed of 
1
adjustment in the holding of deposits is slower than for currency demand. 
In the deposit supply equation, the signs of coefficients of both 
interest rates are correct although the R2 is not particularly high. 
The sign of pK/W implies that an increase in W (relative to PK), due 
to the increased supply of government bonds and currency as well as to 
the accelerated incorporation of firms, induced banks to shift leftward 
their deposit supply schedule with the objective of lowering the deposit 
interest rate paid. This suggests some increase in market power of banks 
related to an increase in W. The coefficient of G/L (L • total bank 
liabilities) is significant and its value =0.88 suggests a strong sub-
stitution effect between G and Das hypothesized. This coefficient 
roughly corresponds to Ds in the theory. 2 
g 
1 
our model in its final form does not include shift parameters 
for changes in the banking habit or banking efficiency. One reason for 
this is we could not find good measures for these effects. For example, 
an experiment with the ratio of the number of banks to population did not 
improve the results. 
2
The long-run equilibrium value is -1.098. Estimations using G/pK 
or G/W instead of G/L did not yield good results, so that exact comparison 
with the theoretical analysis is not possible. 
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1Due to the inadequacy of data for this early period, the results 
of estimation, although fairly satisfactory, are not robust enough 
to allow conditional simulation experiments of G policy. However, 
since Japan was quite successful in promoting deposit banking in this 
period (the ratio of private deposits to corporate net worth rose 
from 0.17 in 1888 to 0.46 in 1913) and G was reduced drastically (the 
ratio of G to total bank liabilities was 0.17 in 1888 and 0.03 in 1913), 
it can be conjectured there occurred a significant substitution between 
G and private deposits. 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
With regard to the problem of how to develop deposit banking, 
we have analysed two broad questions. Both the development of the 
banking habit and of efficiency of bank operations as formally repre­
sented by autonomous shifts of assets demand and supply functions are 
2theoretically effective in fostering deposit banking. While these 
shifts are basically desirable, it is not easy to specify policy 
1One most important difficulty lies in the definition of net worth. 
Since this period is characterized not only by rapid development of 
deposit banking but also by the accelerated incorporation of business 
firms, corporate net worth (paid-in equity and reserves, increased much 
faster than the real capital stock. Since our data on net worth of assets 
holders does not include the equity capital of unincorporated firms (since 
data are not available), there is a possibility of significant bias in our 
estimation. As Silber [1975] emphasizes, much work needs to be done on 
the interaction of the development of direct financing and indirect 
financing, theoretically as well as empirically. 
2Except for one paradoxical case for shifts in the demand functions 
of deposits and currency. 
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i
measures for this purpose and it is likely to take a long time for 
the effects of policy measures to be realized. Perhaps these shifts 
should be pursued in a broader policy framework of overall modern­
ization of the economy. 
The policy of reducing Gunder free interest rates, on the other 
hand, has a more definite result and at least is more operational for 
policy. In view of the substantial dependence on G of LDC banking, 
the possibility of G policy should be considered seriously. However, 
it must be noted that there are many significant differences between 
the actual financial circumstances of LDCs and those which prevailed 
in Meiji Japan and assumed in our theory. First, for many LDCs 
interest rates are far from free and put under strong regulations. 
Second, there are many kinds of regulations on the allocation of 
bank portfolios, which make it necessary to treat both assets and 
liabilities sides of bank activity in evaluating G policy. Third, 
foreign liabilities are additional important sources of funds for 
LDC banking, and their relationship with G and private deposits 
poses another problem to be considered. Fourth, the degree of devel-
opment of a market economy should be taken into consideration. As 
we have shown, G policy is relatively more efficient in a relatively 
more developed market economy because the substitution of G by 
deposits by banks is positively related to the degree of perfection 
of the deposit market. 
With all these qualifications, we believe that the relevance of 
G policy should be considered for each specific phase of a specific 
economy's development. In our assertion for G policy, we agree with 
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McKinnon [1973] in his advocacy of the utilization of market interest 
rates and with Chandler [1962] in his following assault on continuing 
1heavy dependence on Gin LDCs. 
•rt is one thing for a central bank to promote 
the establishment of new financial institutions 
to supervise and examine them, to help them 
developing efficiency and trustworthiness. It 
is quite another to place on the central bank 
heavy continuing responsibility for financing 
these institutions. And this is the situation 
in country after country' (p. 17). 
1
Johnson's policy recommendation concerning the establishment 
of new institutions is also similar to our G policy ([1974] p. 96).
See also Brimmer [1971], p. 785. 
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